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Chapter 0 
Abstract 
This paper is a two-dimensional analysis of agent behavior in a standard New Keyne-
sian ( l K) Macroeconomic model. On the dimension of pure mathematics, we analyze 
the parameters of the K model and of possible prediction rules. On the other dimen-
sion we continue a practice of empirical study of heterogeneous expectations with an 
experiment. The experiment will ask participants to make predictions of future out-
put and inflation. Their responses will create a data-set upon which analysis will be 
performed to illuminate and corroborate current theories of economic decision making. 
The literature has shown that most agents 1 forecasting rules can be modeled by basic 
linear formulae. We conclude that some subject's predictions are consistent with re-
cursively updating coefficient models, while others still use more inscrutable methods. 
Despite this, and regardless of which model fit them best, the subjects' errors were all 
of similar magnitudes. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A f<'aturc that distinguishes economics from the natural sciences is that the beliefs 
of participants in an economic system actually have an effect on what that economic 
system does. This effect. known collectively as "expectations.'· is an integral part of 
all economic theory; however, due to the very large number of participants in a given 
system, quantitatively assessing every agent's cxp('C'tations is extremely cumbersome at 
best and completely impossible at worst. Economists have developed many simplifica-
tions and assumptions to deal with expectations, such as "naive" expectations, where 
agents predict the future will be the same as the pasL. The reigning theory is the Ra-
tional Expectations Hypothesis, which is well-liked for its elegance and computational 
simplicity. The following paragraphs describes the history of expectations, concluding 
with tllC' development of learning, the method that is the focus of this paper. 
Macroeconomics is the study of economic systems with interest in large-scale 
development and patterns across all agents in thr economy. This is in contrast to 
microeconomics where one is interested in profit-maximizing decisions for oneself or 
onr's firm. Many aspects of economics can br exactingly represented mathematically, 
i.e. an interest or inflation rate. At its core, however, economics must quantify the 
decisions and actions of real agents (firms and people). Their decisions and actions have 
direct effect on the outcomes of any given system, and agents take those actions based 
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on what they expect the system do in the fu ture. Actions can take such varied forms 
that to qnant.itatively account for each would be meaninglrss. Therefore economists 
instead account for agents' expectations of the future as a way to represent the intent 
of any particular action an agent takes. 
In microeconomics. this additional input is relativrly trivial. The only "ex-
pectation" one cares about is one's own and therefore a single-input based on the 
firm's/person's goals is all that is needed to fill this gap. In macroeconomics, however, 
outcomes are affected by every agent in the economy and their aggregate expectations. 
Given that macro-models are usually scaled to the size of a country, this means a t least 
hundreds of thousands of agents. Collecting data on individual expectations would be 
exhaustively rxpensive. if not impossible, not to mention that the data would probably 
be outdatt>d by the time collection was complete. To solve this problem, macroe-
conomists have been deriving laws aud assumptions of expectations that might be 
broadly appliC'cl to each agent and approximately represc'nt aggregate expectatio11s. 
One of thr earliest methods to tackle this problem was called "naTve'· expectations. It 
can br described in the following m1rnnrr: 
Where Xt with no superscript is the value of the economic- variable, x, for the time 
period t. Thr superscript e denotes that this is not the adual value of Xt, but the 
value that will be expected of x for time t. The assumption of naive expectations, as 
exprrsscd above, states that the expectation of a variable for the current period, xf, is 
equal to the observed value of that variable in the previous period, Xt-l· 
This assumption worked well as a placeholder, but soon proved to be too simple. 
Agents arc more than capable enough to sec and e.>..i.rapolate trends, as well as have even 
more sophisticated predictions based on other knowledge. The great breakthrough in 
expectations theory came in the form of the Rational ExpcctaLions Hypothesis (REH). 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
For a completely deterministic modc>l, it can be expressed as follows: 
This theory, introduced in Muth (1961) and extended in Lucas (1967). assumes 
that all agents are ''rational., in thC' SC'nse that they can compute the future the same 
way an economist does: with exact knowledge of the framework (often called the "law 
of motion,, of the given system) within which they are an agc•nt and t hat all other agents 
in the franwwork arc rational as well. The only thing a "rational,, agent cannot predict 
is any ra ndom structural shock an economy exhibits in a given period. It should be 
noted that this hypothesis requires significan t and nontrivial assumptions to be taken 
at face value. All agents must not only be very sophisticated, but they must all be 
homogenons in their sophistication. These objections were brought to the REH, and 
were answered to some degree. ProponC'nts argued that even though agents may not 
be homogcnously sophisticated, there arc enough sophisticated agents (banks, financ<' 
professionals, etc) to influence the expectations of less sophisticated agents and guide 
the model towards rational expectations equilibria that can be well approximated by an 
REH model. The REH is still used in most models today, even though its assumptions 
are not often fulfilled, partly bccausr it is entrenched, and partly because a better 
alternative has yet to solidify. 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis works very well in terms of computation 
and allowed economists to analyie models with higher orders of complexity. However, 
many economists were (and arc) skeptical that the average economic agent docs, or 
even can do, what rational expectations assumes they do. The main assumption that 
does not scrm plausible is that aJI agents somehow have perfect knowledge of the 
framework within which they exist, including the true value of each parameter. For 
perspective, this is knowledge about. which even the economic profession has yet to come 
to a consensus. However, it cannot be argued tha t agents make uniformly random or 
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unintelligent decisions; therefore, they must have some non-naive way of proc<'ssing 
information. Lc-'aming theorists posit that agents do not know the parameters and 
structure of th<' law of motion, nor do they delight in substitution and linear algebra, 
but they do have some model (a perceived law of motion) that they rely upon to inform 
their expectations. This model probably begins rudimentary and erroneous, but as an 
agent is able to update the model with more data, it becomes better over time. This 
model can become so good that the agent makrs choices that a truly rational agent 
would make, but in other cases this convergence may never happen; it all drpends 
on the framework and what incentives exist within it. The field began with thought 
experiments such as in Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) and has since developed into 
experiments with real human subjects to divine what "perceived laws of motion" real 
agents form. Learning models have had success in explaining some stylistic qualities 
found in real world data that the REH cannot explain.• 
Numerous studies have been conducted to understand how agents form these 
perceived laws of motion, how they perform, and what effect they have in feedback 
into a given c-'conomic system. These studies focus on asking real humans to predict 
some economic variable over a time period. This paper is similar in intention to Pfajfar 
and Zakclji (2013) and Asscnza, Heemeijer, Hommes and Massaro (2013), in that it 
wishes to understand real agent expectation formation in a macroeconomic framework 
(as opposed to an asset pricing framrwork). Howrver, our study will break new ground 
by asking subjects to predict both the future inflation rate and the future output gap 
simultaneously. 
Prior to the experiment, we also analyze the rffccts and forces of expectation for-
mation from a mathematical perspective. As will be shown, economists often cicscribe 
the economy rn;ing dynamical systems. While real world data is extremely valuable, 
and indeed statistical analysis of such data is an indispensible part of the discipline. 
an economy is a complex system with too many variables to track at once, inlcuding 
*For an in depth discussion of Learning's history see Evans and Ho11kapohja (2001). 
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many that are inscrutable to the point of seeming random. Dynamical mathematical 
systems arc used in this discipline, like in other disciplines, to represent the motion of a 
complex real-world phenomenon. Variables and parameters model the levels and rates 
of economic factors. \Vith a good model, that is, one that represents the real world 
well, researchers can not only study system outcomes, but processes and relationships. 
One can sec not only what happens under normal conditions, but also under extreme, 
or unusual conditions; conditions that otherwise require rare "natural experiments" to 
study. 
This paper is structured as follows: First recent literature is discussed, followed 
by an explanation of the of the New Keynsian model. We continue into a mathematical 
analysis of the system using an exemplary learning rule to furnish expectations. Finally. 
we describe t he design. execution. and results of the experiment. and conclude. 
1.1 Literature Review 
Economists often argue that the Rat ional Expectations Hypothesis (REH) assumes 
too much. The representative agent ca1111ot be credited with having the knowledgr 
necccsary to find the Rational Expectatio11s Solution every time they have to make an 
economic d1oicc. Arthur (1992) argues that there rxists a "Problem Complexity Bar-
rirr" bryond which agents cannot use~ deductive (rational) methods to find a solu tion. 
In these cases they instead employ inductive reasoning: they create a mental model 
(schema) of the framework using similar past rxperirnce, and improve that model with 
any new information gathered as timr goes on. That mental model can be approx-
imated mathematically, and illustrative drcomposition of that model can give great 
insight into how agents interact with t he system thry work in. 
Even if many of its underlying assumptions arr unrealistic, the REH reigns 
supreme because of its elegance and computational simplicity. Furthermore, it is con-
sidered "robust" because in many easel:>, even if agrnts arc not homogenously rational, 
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the existence of some rational agmts can cause convergence to Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibria (REE). However Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) shows that t his 
convergence only happens under certain circumstances, spccificolly when expectation 
feedback is negative, i.e., when age11ts arc rewarded for predicting differently from one 
anoth<.'r. When a system exhibits positive expectation feedback, i.e .. when agents arc 
rewarded for coordinating with each other, non-rational agents can cause volatility 
leading to oscillation, explosive growth, and even convergence to non-rational equilib-
ria. Understaucling what "sign" of expectations feedback is prcse11t gives great insight 
into whether the REH will be sufficirnt in describing the model. 
Even though they note that most frameworks exhibit both ''signs" of expectation 
feedback, as our framework will , Heemeijcr, Hommes, Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2009) 
conducts equivalent experiments on two asset pricing models, one with positive and 
one with negative expectatio11s feedback, to isolate "sig11" as the experimental variable 
and analyzc the results for rationality. Subjects. in groups of 6 or 7, are asked in each 
case to predict the future price of an asset. The price in the positive model persistently 
oscillates even though subjects coordinate with each other very quickly, whereas the 
price in thr nrgativc model co11vergrs slowly to the fundamental price of the asset. 
This shows that for any system with positive expectations frcdback, the REH may 
yield false equilibria. 
Patterns of non-rationality havc always been visible in real world data sets. es-
pecially in the data sets of asset markC'ts, such as a stock market, where expectations 
feedback is positive. The REH and Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) state that an 
asset's prite will always reflect its fundamental value; however, time and time again 
stock prices have exhibited bubbles and other stylize<l non-rat ional behavior. Brock, 
Hommes and Wagener (2005) creates an asset pricing model that allows for any num-
ber of different trader types, any of which can be non-rationa l. These trader types use 
learning models to guide their actions. A simulation of this model is able to quan-
titatively match the vital statistics of 20 years of observed financial data (from the 
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S&P 500). Learning models that outperform the REH in terms of descriptive ability 
continue to legitimize Learning as the sup<>rior option for accounting for expectations 
in C'conomic analysis. Since learning rules arc deriv<'d from the thought process of real 
agent~, recent experiments by and large consist of asking human subjects to make pre-
dictions of some variable's future value in a givrn rconomic framework. Our experiment 
follows in this vein. 
The second goal of this experiment, in line with convention in the field, is to 
analyze the gathered data and attempt to model how subjects form their expectations 
in the game. Most papers have remarkt>d that. a large percentage of their subject's 
predictions can be well approximated by a li1l('ar regression rule (Pfajfar and Zakelji 
(2013) Heemeijer et al. (2009)). Brock and Hommes (1998) develops a more sophisti-
cated '·heuristic switching" mocleL where agents have the choice of a set of different 
forecasting rules, and switch between tlwm depending on which has been recently most 
successful. This model is cited in Assenza ct al. (2013) for fitting data in learning-to-
forccast experiments even better than linear models, and we will be examining the 
samr set of forecasting rules in relation to our data; however, the differences in our 
experimental design may lead to new rules that have yet been unobservable. 
Pfajfar and Zakelji (2013) performs au experiment using a very similar New 
Keynesian framework as will be used in this paper. In contrast to our intention to ask 
subjects to predict both output and inflation, Pfajfar and Zakclji (2013) asked partici-
pants only to predict inflation. The r<'sults showed that expected inflation was always 
higher than realized inflation. suggesting nrgativc expectations feedback. Assenza et 
al. (2013) also performs a very similar experimrnt, running three treatments to sep-
arate the prediction of each variable. The subj<>cts predicted inflation. while output 
expectations are (in the first treatment) expected to be in equilibrium or (in the second 
treatment) assumed to be naive. In the third lreatmcnt, subjects were separated into 
two groups, one predicting output aud one predicting inflation. 
Our project builds upon these papers' experiments. Our experiment has each 
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subject predicting both the inflation rate and thr output gap, as economic agents do in 
the real world. We expect this diffrrrncr will allow agents to make better predictions 
beC'ausc they will receive fccbnck from the effects of both variables. 
Chapter 2 
Framework 
2.1 New Keynesian Macroeconomic Model 
The Kew Keynesian (NK) framework that describes the economy's law of motion. 
as assumed by the experiment., is written below. A full discussion of the model's 
foundations and justifications can be found in Woodford (2003). The monetary policy 
rule was derived in Branch and McGough (2009) and previously used for modeling 
heterogeneous expectations in Asscnza et al. (2013). 
e { · e ) Xt - Xt+l - </> tt - 1i't+ l + 9t 
The endogenous errors 9t and ut are autocorrelated in the following mrurnrr: 
9t = 6gt- 1 + 9t 
Ut = µ ut- 1 f Ut 
Furthermore. Ut and 9t are random stochastic error terms with mean 0 and 
standard deviation 0.2. 
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This is a Dynamic Stochastic General Eq11ilibirum Model (DSGE). The output 
gap and infla tion rate laws of motion are based on micro-foundations of utility maximiz-
ing representative agents and profit maximizing rC'presentative firms. The monetary 
policy rule (interest rate) is based on the perceived actions of the central bank; this rule 
in particular is based on the propensities of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The economy is 
described by three variables (and the expectations thereof): 
• The inflation rate 7rt (subject to random shock ut) 
• The output gap Xt (subjrct to random shock gt) 
• The interest rate it (subject to random shock t:t) 
The inflation rate mrasures the percentage change in the price level of the 
economy. In each period. the inflation rate depends on expectations of itself and output 
gap, as well as on a random minor price shock Ut · There is a positive relationship 
between the actual inflation rate and the exp('Ctations of both the output gap and 
the inflation rate. This means, for example, that if all other fac tors are the same, 
an increase in the expectations of the inflation rate will cause an increase in the real 
inflation rate. The minor price shocks have an equal chance of affecting inflation 
positively or negatively. 
The output gap measurt's thr percent difference between Gross Domestic 
Product(GDP ) and the natural GDP. The GDP of a country is the value of all goods 
produced during a period in the economy. ~atural GDP is the value that total produc-
tion would havr been if the economy had achrivrd full employment. If the output gap 
is positive (negative), the economy has produced more (less) than t he natural GDP. 
In each period, the output gap depends on both the rxpecations of itself, expectations 
of the inflation ra te. the interest rate. and on a minor economic shock 9t· There is a 
positive relationship between the output gap and t he expectations of both the interest 
rate and output gap. There is a negative relationship between the output gap and 
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the interest rate. The minor economic shocks ha\·e an equal chance of positively or 
negatively affecting the output gap. 
The inter est rate measures the price of borrowing money and is determined 
by the central bank. There is a positive relationship between the interest rate and the 
inflation rate. 
The subscripts t are indicative of the period of the variable. i.e. 7r6 would 
indicate the inflation rate in period 6. The framework assumes that expectations of 
the output gap and inflation arc made from two periods behind. That is to say that 
they are expc•ctations of the next period ( t+ 1) made with only the information available 
in the last pC'riod (t - 1). As it will bC'come a necessary distinction in the next section, 
this is clarified as follows: 
We will modify this assumpt ion in the next chapter, so that predictions arc 
only made one period behind. Th<> rC'st of the framework will remain unchanged for 
the remainder of this paper,s discussion. 
2.2 Operating Law of Motion 
For the model to be used to simulate ru1 economy, and tlwreforc yield any useful results, 
we are ourselves faced with the quest ion of how to quantify expectations. In order 
to perform parameter tests, we allowed expectations to be formed by an establ ishrd 
learning rule from Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Expectations are created in the 
following mannrr: 
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The coefficeints ait> bi,ji are updated each period with the below process: 
Where: 
bi,1i = '1/Jt = '1/Jt-1+1RtZt-1 (xt - z;_1'1/Jt- 1) 
bi,21 
az1 
bz,1i = '1/Jt = '1/Jt-1+1RtZt- 1(7rt - z;_1'1/Jt- 1) 
b2,2t 
1 
Zt- 1 = Xt- l and Rt = Rt- 1+1(Zt- 1z:_1 - Rt- 1) 
7ft-l 
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This updates the coefficients with a Regressive Least Squares process on past informa-
tion. 
For simplicity's sake, this model assumes that expectations are formed from 
only one period behind. It gives the expectations of the output gap and inflation rate 
in the current period, given knowledge of the period immediately previous: 
This diverges from an earlier discussed assumption of the K framework in 
Section 2.1, but makes little practical difference, and results found in later parameter 
analysis arc applicable to a framework with a two-period assumption. We will note 
later that this contemporaneous assumption does seem to make the system more stable. 
Chapter 3 
Numerical System Analysis 
This chapter will discuss the mathematical analysis performed before the experiment 
to study the behavior of the 1cw Keynesian framework when furnished by the chosen 
learning rule. Both the system and the learning rule were constructed in MATLAB 
2012. The results in this chapter were generated by that construction.* 
Table 3.1 below summarizes each parameter in the system as well as/, the gain 
parameter from the learning rule. All calibrated valurs from Gali and Gertler (1999)t. 
Table 3.1: Each parameter in the New Keynesian Framework and the description, 
possible range, a11cl calibrated values of each. Also includes the range of /, the gain 
paramrtcr from the learning rule. 
Notation Drscription Range Calibrated Value 
A The slope of the Phillips curve A>O 0.3 
f3 The Global discount factor 0 < f3 < 1 0.99 
¢> The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution ¢>0 1 
(}'If The· interest rate's responsiveucss to inflation (}'If > 0 1.5 
'Y Learniug gain parameter 0 :51:51 n/a 
Figure 3.1 brlow shows a 60-period simulation of the system, as represented by 
•The MATLAB code used for all of this chapter's analysis is available in the Appendix. 
tcalibration is done through mathematical programming based on fundamental economic theory. 
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the outcomes of the output gap. The two thin lines show two out of the thousand sim-
ulated paths to represent the shape that a single simulation might take and illustrates 
the stochastic nature of the system. The bold line is the average of all one thousand 
paths at each period. It is notable that the average path stays very close to zero, which 
is the value that a model using rational expectations would converge to, but it does not 
quite stay there.This deviation is likely the result of using a learning rule to generate 
expectations for the model, and exhibits change throughout the experiments below. 
Figure 3.1: The Output Gap over 1000 simulations with the parameters set to their 
calibrated values, aud / = 0.2. The bold line is the average path over 1000 simula-
tions. The two thinner lines in each graph are representative of what each of the 1000 
individual paths could look like. 
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3 .1 Effects of / 
The parameter / describes how much an agent weights the most recent information 
when they form their expectations. Figure 3.2 below shows the effect on the output 
gap when 'Y is assigned different values in the interval (0, 1). The bold line shows the 
average over 1000 simulations, and the thinner lines show representative paths. The 
last graph plots all of the averages from the five treatments on the same axes. 
Figure 3.2: The Output Gap over 1000 simulations for each of 5 different values of 
/. As/ gets closer to 1, the more output gap becomes more sensitive to shocks. The 
average trend, however, stays relatively constant. though ii floats above the Rational 
Expectations outcome of 0. 
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Though particular paths oscillate at varying intensities, the long term trend 
(shown by the average) is similar no matter the value of 'Y· This is best illustrastcd by 
the bottom right graph of averages which all seem to traC'c the same line. Since the 
trend is not being affected, we will find the standard deviation of the output gap for 
each treatment. Table 3.2 at t he end of Section 3.2 shows the result. 
In addition, we were surprised that the system wa.c; so stable. It has been ob-
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srvered in thc> past that learning rules with large gains do not provide stable equilibria. 
To tC"st th is s tability we ran the same simulation as in Figure 3.2 for 3000 periods 
instead of 60, and found that the systC'm wns stable for the cnt ire range, and for each 
value of 'Y· We bclcive this stability eomes from the contemporaneous assumption. 
3. 2 Effects of A 
Since conc:civablc values of 'Y change Lhe variability but not tho trend of the output 
gap, we changed the calibrated value of .X to 0.6 . .X is the slop<' of the Phillips curve, 
which describes the relationship between unemployment and inflation. In other words, 
it is a parameter that describes the "stickiness" of the economy's prices. It can also 
been thought of as the "speed of price adjustment." When prices are less "sticky", or 
update to accomodatc new conditions swiftly, the economy can better handle shocks 
and volatility is reduced. When priers a rc more '·sticky," random shocks have more 
inertia. which is to say the system takes longer to recover from their influence. Figure 
3.3 shows the effects of changing 'Y in a significantly less "sticky" environment than the 
calibrated value. Again, The bold line shows the average ovrr 1000 simulations, and 
the thinner lines show repre::;entative paths. 
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Figure 3.3: Effects of .X = 0.6 on the Output Gap for 5 different values of"/- The higher 
.X simulates an economy with less "sticky" prices, therefore stochastic shocks are dealt 
with more flexibly and the paths stay closer to the average trend. The average trend 
is dampened vertically and closely approaches the Rational Expectations outcome at 
0. 
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As is expected, the variability in the output gap is visibly decreased when .X is 
larger. This implies that quickly adjusting prices helps agents forecast better, which 
makes intuitive sense in addition to agreeing with standard economic theory. Table 3.2 
below shows that the standard deviation of the output gap when .X = 0.6 varies little 
with respect to a changing/, though the amount of volatility was positively correlated 
to / when .X was equal to its calibrated value of 0.3. 
Table 3.2: Standard deviations of the Output Gap given differing values of/ and .X. 
Variation is significantly lower with higher .X. 
Std Dev "I= 0.01 "I= 0.2 ' = o .. s "f = 0.7fi ' = 0.99 
.X = 0.3 0.2448 0.3969 0.3805 0.4172 0.6485 
.A = 0.6 0.1898 0.2580 0.3036 0.2814 0.3255 
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3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of -A and ¢ 
Noting the damping effect of>., we decided to perform sensitivity analyses to determine 
whrther there exist particularly sensitive ranges of the parameter that lead to partic-
ularly intense changes in the outcome variables. If >. is particularly sensitive in some 
ranges, then economic systems exhibiting >.'s within those ranges might be considered 
vulnerable to a smaller change than a system with a more "stable" value of >.. We 
performed the same analysis with ¢, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In 
both cases, results were inconclusive. 
To examine the sensitivity of>., we usrd the same numerical framework as above 
in terms of the operating law of motion and calibrated parameter values. To isolate>. ·s 
effects away from the stochastically generated noise, we again use the average of one 
thousand (N = 1000) simulations. Let v~ be the valur of one of the three variables of 
interest (output gap. inflation rate, or intert>st rate) wl1C'n >.is 13 less than the value 
of lambda for the computation of Vt· Then, the below quantity gives us the change in 
a variable's outcome, given a small change in >.. 
We then compute /::,.v for all >. = .9>., .91>. .. 92>., ... , 1.09>., 1.1>., giving us a spectrum of 
fluctuations caused by equal changes in >.. Figure 3.4 shows these spectra for all three 
variables of interest. 
Q. 
'" (!) 
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity of the Output Gap, Inflation Rate and Interest Rate to uniform 
changes to A. Uniformity indicates an insensitive interval of A and intervals where 
adjacent values exhibit significant height difference migh be considered sensitive. The 
very small scale of these differences, and the lack of consistency over repeated trials, 
leads to the conclusion t hat the variation seen below is likely just muted stochastic 
noise. 
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At first glance it seems as if >. docs have sensitive points along this spectrum; 
however, two factors indicate otherwise. First, despite all of the averaging to reduce 
the effect of the stochastic shocks, repetition of this simulation produced different 
resultant curves. Second, the scale of the changes is extremely small and the changes 
probably are themselves only noise. While this is dissapointing, it is not surprising; 
this economic model, especially when a recursive data-based learning rule furnishes the 
expectations, is known to be particularly stable. Therefore this inconclusive sensitivity 
analysis seems only to provide evidence for conventional economic wisdom. 
We arrive at the same conclusion in the case of ¢. Concluding this chapter, 
Figure 3.5 below looks very similar to the above graph for >., and was produced using 
the same tlv equation as above. It succumbs to the same failings as the sensitivity 
analysis of A, in that any perceivable variation is miniscule in absolute scale, and that 
repeated trials yield inconsistent results. It is worth noting that both ¢ and A are 
both compound parameters that economists are still uncertain about. Calibrations 
for both are difficult to ascertain and often unreliable. This impenetrability could be 
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contributing the the inconclusiveness of these results. 
Figure 3.5: Sensitivity of the Output gap, Inflation Rate and Interest Rate to unifonn 
changes to </>. Uniformity indicates an insensitive interval of ¢> and intervals where 
adjacent values exhibit significant height difference migh be considered sensitive. The 
very small scale of these differences, and the lack of consistency over repeated trials 
leads to the conclusion that the variation seen below is most likely just muted stochastic 
noise. 
0.012,....- ~-~-~----. 
0.01 
001 
095 I 11'> 
Rongo alPt. 
I .I 095 1 105 
Rongo alPt. 
I.I 0.95 I I 05 
Rongo alPt. 
11 
Chapter 4 
Results 
Over three rxpcriments, twenty-sevrn (27) subjects completed the simulation. Wr 
proceed in this section to analyze this data set, and compare the subject's predictive 
behavior to that of various posited learning rules, including the one used for mathc-
matical analysis in earlier chapters. 
4.1 Experimental Design 
The following procedure was performed on three separate occas ions, on the dates of 
March 19th. 22nd, and 30th. 
Subjects were recruited via on-campus advert isement and were exclusively vol-
unteers. Prior to agreeing to be a part of the experiment they were given only the 
information available from a campus-wide email advertisement. Subjects arrived at 
room Pthalcr 106 at Ursinus College, with instructions to bring their school issued 
laptops.• Subjects signed a consent form to participate in accordance with µ rt!vaili11g 
IRB protocols. ·when they signed the form, they were each given a random username. 
The subjects were then asked to navigate to a webpage hosted on a local Ursinus server 
*St udents at Ursinus College arc given ubiquitous laptops as part of entry into the undergraduate 
program. 
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where they were instructed to log in using their given usernarne. 
Subjects were given a basic description of the economy via a written digital 
information packrt.1 The researcher gave a brief verbal description of the exprriment 
and its most important details, and then subjects were let into the main game page 
at the same time. Figure 4.1 b('low is au example of what thr f:Ubjects saw on that 
screen: 
Figure 4.1: Ga.me Screen as seen by participants 
EoonGraph 
4.5 
3.0 
1.5 
0.0 - · (\ !\ 
Expected output r 
Expected icftation: 
!Last quarter comparison! 
!Field llYour guessllActuat Valuel 
I Output 11-0.5 Jl-0.091 I 
I Inflation 111.467 111.205 I 
• Output 
• Inflation 
As a starting point, five periods of inflation and output data already populated 
each user's database, and were presented on the graph as when the subject saw it for the 
tSimilar to qualitative descriptions in Section 2.1. An exact copy of the participant information 
packet is available i11 appendix. 
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first time. Subjects were then allowed to proceed at their own pace and make gucssrs 
about the next period as quickly as they liked. As soon as a subject inputted cstima-
tions for both the output gap and i11flatio11 rate, the web application used those values 
to calculate the next values of output inflation using the exact ·ew Keynsian model 
described in Chapter 2. Each subject participated in their own personal "economy"' 
and was the singular source of expectations.t This continued for sixty (60) iterations. 
Each iteration, the program keeps track of each individual subject's absolute 
error in guessing both the output gap and the inflation rate. At the end of the game, 
either the output gap error data or inflation rate error data was chosen at random for 
each participant. Each participant was compensated based only on their predictive 
error with regard to only the variable that the game dwsr for them randomly. This 
method was meant to preserve the incentive for subjects to continually exert effort in 
predicting both variables over the arduous sixty-period game. Each subject was also 
given a "base pay" of 85 for simply participating! added onto their total earnings. A 
full compensation schedule and other game materials are available in the appendix. 
4 .2 Groupings 
Table 4.1 is a list of rules that agents might conceivably use to predict inflation. It 
is reproduced from Pfajfar and Zakdji (2013). Though this table refers only to the 
forecasting of the inflation rate, the structures can be used to predict other variabl<?s, 
such as the output gap, as well. Our operating law of motion, as outlined in 2.2, is of 
a "Recursive" form, similar to the models marked as M7 through MIO. 
twe have been laying the groundwork for a future experiment where a large number of subjects 
interact in a singl<' virtual economy. Sec Chapt<'r 5. 
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Table 4.1: Possible learning rules for agents predicting the inflation rate. Reproduced 
from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2013) 
~Iodel (Eq.) 
AR{l ) process (l\11) 
Stick1· information type (~12) 
AdaptiYe e~'])ectations CCL (:\I3) 
AdaptiYe e..'\.'])ectations DGL (l\I4) 
Trend e>..1:rapolation (l\I5) 
General model (1'16) 
Recursive - lagged inflation (l\17) 
RecursiYe - lagged output gap (1'I8) 
Recursh'e - trend extrapolation {l\19) 
RecursiYe - AR(l) process (l\110) 
Lagged output gap (1111) 
Lagged inflation (l\112) 
Specification 
k k 
iTt+I t = C\Q + 0.11Tt t-1 
1r:+i t = .A117o-A171lYt-1 + (l- .A1)1r~t-l 
k k -~( k ) iTt+l t = il't-1 t-2 "'t' v il't-1 - iTt-1 t-2 
k - k '( k ) il't+l t - iit-1 t-2 + t iit-1 - 'jj"t-1 t-2 
'ii~l t =To+ 1Tt-1 + T1 (1Tt-1 - 'iit-2) : 7"1 2: 0 
k . 
1Tt+1 t = Oo + Cl1il't-1 + 0.2Yt-1 + a3Yt-1 + a.itt-t 
11':+1 t = t+Jo.t-1 + 01.t-11l't-1 
ii~+l t = VO.t-1 + 91,t-1Yt-1 
1T:+i t = uo.t-1 + il't-1 + ol.t-1 (;rt-1 - n-1-2) 
_k - 0 + 0 11'k 
"t+l t - O.t-1 1.t-1 t it-1 
n-:+1 t = Oo + 01Yt-1 
'ir:+1 t =Vo+ 011Tt-t 
\Ve will attempt to group our subjects into categories based on the similarity of 
their <'xpcctation formation to those that would have been created by these learning 
rules. Specifically we focus on recursive rules, like our own earlier stated operating law 
of motion, and the models M7 and 1vI8 above, which rely on only past inflation rate 
values and only past output gap values respectively. In the case of our experiment, 
however, our subjects had to predict both the inflation rate and output gap, thus we 
have more options for what dataset ii; ui;cd Lo predicL which future variable. To be 
precise, we will try to reconcile our results with Lhrcc different recursive rules operating 
on different sets of data: 
We will compare the results to these rules by visual comparison, as well as by com-
paring the autocorrelation coefficients of each subject 's predictions. As a baseline, 
Figure ?? shows the paths and autocorrelations for the three simulation learning rules. 
The following Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show Nt<'h of the subject's expected output and 
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inflation paths respectively. The 27 subjects have been separated according to their 
autocorrelation coefficienfs similarity to our baseline learning rules. If the subject's 
autocorrelations were dissimilar entirely to the posited lC:'arning rules, they were placed 
in a fourth category. 
4.3 Conclusions 
After this experiment, a couple of facts arc immediately dear. First, the absolute error 
of the human subjects predictions is much larger in magnitude than the error of any of 
the proposed learning rules if 'Y = 0.01 , as it was in our earlier numerical analysis. This 
is clC'ar from Table 4.2: to even see the contours of the rules' paths. the scale has to be so 
reduced that the predictions of the subjects seem like random noise. However, when I 
is increased. the rules get closer in volatility to the predictions pf the subjects. For <l>x,r.' 
letting 'Y = 0.25 makes it so volatile that tlw system soon exhibits nonsensical values of 
arbitrary size. This is consistent with a phenomenon observed in Marcet and Sargent 
(1989): when predicitons are based on lagged cudogenous information, an extreme 
stochastic shock can destabilize the system. Second, many of the subjects could loosely 
be' C'atcgorizcd by their autocorrelation coefficients to fit the predicitive pattern of one of 
the thrrc learning rules. However, many of the subjects had autocorrelation coefficients 
lower than 0.5 for both predictions of the output gap and the inflation rate. 
Table 4.2: Behaviors of </>01,,n ~ <l>x.-rr and </>'tr,x over 60 periods with shocks identical to those faced by experiment participants. The 
black1 blue and red lines are the simulated behavior of the rules with gain parameter 'Y (as discussed in Section 3.1) inhabiting the 
values 0.01, 0.1 and 0.25 respectively. The y<'llow lines are the paths of all 27 subjects. The autocorrelation coefficeint of each path is 
shown as well, and is indicative of each rule's pattern. The Middle rule do<'s not show the path for 'Y = 0.25 (red) because for that 
value, both output gap and inflation rate predictions became arbitrarily large. 
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Figure 4.2: Subjects' output gap expectations, grouped according to similarities in autocorrelation coefficients to </>oLR, </>:c;ir and </>rr,:c· 
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Figure 4.3: Subjects' inflation rate expectations, grouped according to similarities in autocorrelation coefficients to </>oLR, <f>x.'lr and t;1 
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Figure 4.4: The errors of each subject for every period. The top graph shows the errors 
for the Output Gap and the bottom shows the errors for the Inflation Rate. 'While 
thrrr arc outliers, most subjects· errors share a tight band. 
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None of the three rules suggested, which together cover all possible recursive 
uses of the information available on the two variables of the output gap and inflation 
rate, produce an autocorrelation coefficient lower than 0.5. All of these rules were 
quite accurate in their predictions, so it serms a resonable conclusion that using past 
rxpectations to inform future ones (which is the cause of autocorrelation) is a "good" 
stratrgy for having accurate predictions. The rules come even closer to the subjecf s 
predictive behavior when 'Y is in the range of 0.1 to 0.25. However, many of t he 
subjects· autocorrelation coefficients were below 0.5, even some as low as 0.2. Despite 
this difference, Figure 4.4 shows that the errors were for t he most part tightly clustered. 
and t hat subjects performed comparably relative to those subjects whose predictions 
do fit a recursive rule. This not only implies that there are many predicitve rules that 
agents caJ1 use, but also that those rules caJ1 all be similarly effective. 
Chapter 5 
Future Work 
The future of this line of experimentation lies in coordinating the experiment to have 
every agent be a part of the same simulated economy. This would give each individual 
subject a more realistic economy, where they are not the only all-powerful predictive 
agent. It would also allow the researchers to examine what interaction and coordination 
occurs among subjects, even when they do not conciously know that there are others 
in the same economy. We are close to having the software infrastructure neccesary 
to be able to perform this higher complexity experiment. Even beyond this goal, 
further research could examine the effects of giving the forecasted values of a random 
participant in a multi-subject economic simulation disproportionate weight. This would 
give insight into the power that influential institutions or people have when they make 
economic forecasts. 
On the mathematical dimension, more research can be done on the behavior of 
the model under different learning rules, and with different parameter values. With 
more data, optimization techniques could be employed to estimate the coefficients of a 
general learning rule that does not rely on recursively updating coefficients. This rule 
might help describe the actions of those subjects who did not fit one of our proposed 
rescursive rules. Unchanging coefficients would be consistent with lower autocorrela-
tion. 
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Chapter 7 
Appendix 
7.1 Compensation Schedule 
This compensation method adapted from Homme~'>, Sonncmans, Tuinstra and van de 
Velden (2005) 
SHbjccts will receive a base compensation of $5 for arriving to participate in the 
experiment. Average earnings per participant should be near £15 per session, including 
the $5 "show-up,, fee. This compensation schedule is similar to the asset pricing model 
experiments conducted by Cars Hommcs, with the difference being that the error term 
used in the below computation will be chosen raudomly for each participant at the end 
of the experiment. This formula uses a points-basrd systrm, where points have a fixed 
cxchangr rate for dollars at the end of the gamc. During preliminary trials we found 
that subjects were much better at predicting the inflation rate than the output gap. so 
we adjusted the exchange rates so that average performance would be rewarded equally 
for whichever variable is chosen. The exchange rates, for the output gap and inflation 
rate respectively, are: 
Px = 5200 points / dollar 
p1f = 8350 points / dollar 
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX 39 
The formula for earning µoillts is displayc·d below. Let vi be the variable, either 
the output gap ( x) or the inflation rate ( 1f), randomly chosen for subject i. Let Vit 
be exactly equal to that variabl<' in period t, and vft be subject i's prediction for that 
varirable in period t. 
Where eit is tlw point earnings in period t of subject i. Total earnings for subject i in 
dollar terms can be calculated by: 
5 + L:;:o(eit) 
Pi 
Where T is the total number of periods. and Pi is the appropriat<' exchange rate. In 
the case of this experiment, T - 60. 
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7.2 Participant Packet 
Experiment Set-Up 
You have volunteered to participate in an experiment of economic decision making. 
Please read the following pages of instructions before beginning. 
• All of the experiment will be conducted on this computer. At t he end of the 
experiment, you will be asked to answer some questions about how it went. 
• If you haYe a calculator you may use it. You do NOT need a calculator to 
participate. 
• If you have a question during the experiment, raise your hand. A researcher will 
come to assist you. 
Information about your role 
In this expNiment, you are a statistical researcher. You are going to make predictions 
about the o utput gap and inflation rate of the fictional in-game economy. You 
are one of many researchers, and will make predictions about both the output gap 
and inflation rate for each of 60 periods. You need no real statistical knowledge to 
make these predictions. but you arr welcome to use any knowledge you do have. The 
amount of your compensation, disprnsed in the form of Ursinus bookstore credit , will 
be directly related to how accurate your predictions are. 
Information about the Economy 
The experiment's economy is described by three variables: 
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• the inflation rate 1ft 
• the output gap Xt 
• the interest rate it 
The inflat ion rate measures the percentage change in the price level of the 
economy. In each period, the inflation rate depends on the inflation rate and output 
gap predictions of all agents in the economy (including those maclc by yourself and some 
other statistical researchers) and on random minor price shocks. There is a positive 
relationship between the actual inflation rate and BOTH the inflation predictions and 
output predictions of the statistical researchers. This means, for example, that if all 
other factors arc the same, an increase in the predictions of the inflation rate will cause 
an increase in thr real inflation rate. The minor price shocks havr an equal chance of 
affecting inflation positively or negatively. 
The output gap measures the percent difference between the Gross Domestic 
Product{GDP) and the natural GDP. The GDP is the value of all goods produced 
during a period in the economy. The natural GDP is the value the total production 
would have been if prices in the rconomy would be fully employed. If the output gap 
ii:; positive (negative), the economy has produced more (less) than the natural GDP. 
In each period, the output gap depends on the inflation predictions and output gap 
predictions of the statistical researchers, on the interest rate and on minor economic 
shocks. There is a positive relationship between the output gap and the inftatio11 and 
output gap predictions. There is a negative relationship between the output gap and 
thr interest rate. The minor economic shocks have an equal chance of positively or 
negatively aff<'Ct.ing t.hP. outpuf p;ap. 
The interest rate measures the price of borrowing money and is detennined 
by the central bank. There is a positive relationship between the interest rate and the 
inflation rate. 
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The subscripts t are representativr of the period of the variable; i.e., 7r6 would 
indicate thr inflation rate in period 6. t will go from 1 to 60 as the experiment proceeds. 
Your predictions 
In this experiment you will be asked to predict BOTH the output gap and inflation 
rate in each period. When the experiment starts you will be asked to predict infiation 
rate and output gap, i.e. xr and 11-r, for the next period based on a short list of the 
preceding 5 periods (periods -4 to 0) inflation rates and output gaps. (The superscript 
e denotes that t hrse are predictions.) 'When you and other participating researchers 
have mtercd both predictions, the actual output gap an<l inflation rate for period 1 
will be published and viewable on your screen. You will then make your predictions 
for the next period, x2 and 7r2, with access to this new information. This process will 
continue for 60 periods. 
The historical range of inflation is between -5% and 15%. 
The historical range of the output gap is between -5% and 5%. 
About your compensation 
You will earn compensation proportional to the accuracy of your predictions. J ust for 
participating you will begin with a "show-up fee" of $5. At t he end of the experiment, 
the computer will randomly choose eithrr the inflation rate or the output gap. You 
will be compensated for your accuracy in relation to predicting that variable. To be 
clear. nobociy will know which variable determines your compcusation until after the 
conclusion of the experiment, so it is in your best interest to be accurate in your 
predictions of both the output gap and the inflation rate. 
Wlwn the computer randomly makes a decision, it will use your predictions 
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from the experiment to find your earnings ei. for each period t. Th<' sum of all et plus 
your $5 show up fee is your total compensation. ei is calculated an error formula, but 
the b0low table shows some cxo.mplcs of <'£trning based on accuracy: 
Average Error Total Earnings for Output Total Earnings for inflation 
0 . 01 $23 . 06 $14 . 36 
0 . 025 $22 .98 $14. 31 
0.05 $22 . 71 $14 .14 
0 . 075 $22.24 $13.85 
0 . 1 $21. 60 $13.45 
0 . 125 $20.77 $12.93 
0.15 $19.75 $12.30 
0 .175 $18.55 $11.55 
0 .2 $17.16 $10.69 
0 . 225 $15.59 $9.71 
0 .25 $13.83 $8.61 
0 .275 $11.89 $7.40 
0 .3 $9.76 $6 . 08 
0 .325 $7.45 $4.64 
0 .35 $4 . 96 $3 . 09 
0.375 $2.27 $1.42 
0 . 4 $0.00 $0.00 
It is important to not<' that earniugs drop off quickly as accuracy decreases. 
Each period you have oppurtunity for gain, but for any significant profit your prediction 
must be within a few tenths of a percentage point of the actual outcome. Predicting 
the inflation rate has been shown to be easier than predicting output, so in fairness 
predicting the inflation rate is rewardrd i<'ss. 'vVe expect your average earnings to be 
in the yellow boxed areas. The schedule' ensures that the average earnings of each 
participant, whether selected to be paid on the basis of output or inflation prediction, 
will be near $10. All payment will be given a fte r t he fact , in the form of 
Ursinus bookstore credit. 
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About the Computer Program 
Reproduced below is a screenshot of the program you arc about to use. It is made up 
of three parts. In the upper left is a time-series graph of the economy's inflation rate 
and output gap. The vertical axis is marked in percentages, and the horizontal axis 
shows the time periods. Notice the next period is always on the right-hand side. 
EoonGraph 
4.5 
3.0 
1.5 
0.0 - {\ (\ 
Expected output L 
·.---=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::==., 
Expected inflation: [ 
f Submit t 
!Last quarter comparisonj 
!Field jjYour guessjjActual Valucl 
!Output 11-0.5 11-0.091 I 
!Inflation llt.467 llt.205 I 
• Output 
• .-iflation 
Below the graph arc input boxes where you will type in your predictions for 
each period. You MAY use decimals to express a prediction between two integer per-
ccntages, e.g., "1.3." Simply use a period ''." as the decimal point. You M AY predict 
negative values. Use a hyphen "-" as the negative sign, e.g., "-5." You MAY NOT 
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enter a decimal value out beyond the thousandths' place. If you do, your prediction 
will be truncated to the nearest thousandth. (If you enter., 4.6789'' it will be recorded 
1-1.<.; "4.678".) 
Once you have made a prediction, a tablr will appear below the input boxes 
showing your last prediction, and the numerical value of the actual outcomt'S this 
period. Use this to guide your next guesses. 
CHAPTER 7. APPENDIX 46 
7.3 Advertisement Email 
CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS FOR ECONOMIC STUDY. COMPENSATION PRO-
VIDED BASED ON PERFORMACE. 
Come spend an hour of your timr to participate in a study into how people 
form economic expectations about the future. You will be asked to make predictions 
about the future of a fictional economy over many periods. The more accurate your 
predictions, the morr you '11 be paid! All payment will be giwn in the form of Ursinus 
book store gift cards. Contact atgravcn@ursinus.edu. 
